This paper presents a North-South model with di¤erentiated goods being produced in the North. Each di¤erentiated …nal good requires both management and manufacturing services as inputs, and …rms are heterogeneous with regard to their productivity levels in providing these inputs. Moving manufacturing to the South lowers part of a …rm's variable costs. Two scenarios, which are interpreted to correspond to vertical FDI and o¤shoring, are investigated. In both cases there is a minimum level of management productivity required for …rms to bene…t from relocation of manufacturing to the South. In the case of o¤shoring, productivity and pro…t gains are relatively larger for …rms with low initial manufacturing productivity. In addition, …rms with very high initial productivity in both aspects choose not to o¤shore due to the presence of …xed costs. The model is subsequently used to examine the implications of changes in economic integration on the type of …rms that exit an industry, change production location or keep manufacturing domestically.
in the same location as the headquarters, opening up the economy to the possibility of o¤shoring results in …rms selecting themselves into di¤erent categories. Firms with a low level of management productivity will continue to choose only between domestic production and exit, depending on their draw for manufacturing productivity. It is only …rms that reach a minimum level of management productivity that consider moving their production process abroad. Furthermore, of those …rms with su¢ ciently high management productivity it is the ones with low manufacturing productivity that bene…t the most from the move. As a corollary, some …rms with very high initial productivity in both areas will opt to remain local producers. Comparing the case of a closed economy where manufacturing is not internationally mobile to the open case reveals the di¤erent characteristics of winners and losers.
Firms that go out of business are characterized by relatively low management productivity. On the other hand, …rms that have a high management productivity but very low manufacturing productivity now enter the market and produce making use of the o¤shoring option.
Moving the manufacturing part of the production process abroad incurs a …xed cost, but at the same time lowers variable costs. Two distinct scenarios that di¤er with regard to the bene…ts accruing to a …rm from moving manufacturing to the South are examined: In the …rst scenario, the marginal costs after moving the manufacturing process abroad are independent of the …rm's prior draw for manufacturing productivity. This scenario is interpreted to re ‡ect the case of o¤shoring, in the sense that the …rm's initial level of manufacturing expertise is irrelevant once that particular production stage is moved to the South and manufacturing occurs at arm's-length. In the second scenario, the marginal costs after moving the manufacturing process are proportional to the …rm's manufacturing costs prior to the move. This case can be thought of as re ‡ecting vertical FDI, in the sense that the …rm's initial expertise in manufacturing still matters and the productivity ranking of …rms remains intact even after shifting the production stage to the South. Incidentally, this scenario is isomorphic to a model where the wage rate in the South is assumed to be permanently lower, as in Grossman et al (2006) .
The distinction between o¤shoring and vertical FDI made in this paper di¤ers from the recent literature that models the relationship between …nal-good producer and supplier explicitly, focusing on relationship-speci…c investment (see, for example, Antràs (2003) and the references therein). In contrast to the work by Antràs and Helpman (2004) , the focus of this paper does not lie in modeling the …rms' decision between integration and arm's-length agreements with their suppliers. Instead, the assumption that …rms are exactly equally pro…cient in providing management and manufacturing inputs for the production of the …nal good is relaxed. As a result, there are several modeling options regarding the change in manufacturing productivity (which is also the change in manufacturing marginal costs) arising from relocation to the South. The concepts of o¤shoring and vertical FDI are used loosely to motivate my choices among those modeling options.
Trade theory's interest in explicitly modeling di¤erences among …rms has soared in recent years.
Empirical results …rst documented by Jensen (1995, 1998 ) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) have shown that …rms that export are signi…cantly di¤erent form …rms that do not. On average, exporting …rms are larger, more productive, more capital-intensive, more technology-intensive, and pay higher wages. Later work has con…rmed the robustness of these …ndings across countries and industries. More recently, work by Lipsey (2002, 2006) suggests that foreign-owned …rms are signi…cantly di¤erent from their domestically owned peers. Again, they are on average more productive and pay higher wages. Melitz (2003) was the …rst to provide a theoretical model of trade that integrated the idea of heterogeneous …rms and endogenously generated the result that the most productive …rms export, …rms with lower productivity choose to produce only for the domestic market and …rms with very low productivity immediately exit the market. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) extend the model to incorporate horizontal foreign direct investment. In accordance with the empirical facts, the …rms sort themselves according to their productivity into …rms that engage in FDI, export, only produce for the domestic market or exit. Helpman et al. also provide additional empirical support for this particular ordering. In another paper, Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) study the e¤ects of …rm heterogeneity on …rm choice between various integration strategies. While their 'menu' of strategies for each …rm is larger because they do not only consider vertical FDI, their modeling of the production process di¤ers from mine. The main di¤erence is that …rms draw one general productivity parameter for overall marginal costs and that there is no explicit modeling of a …rm-speci…c factor that is assumed to be a key driver of vertical FDI.
The assumption of an immobile management input and a mobile manufacturing input into …nal good production is similar to work by Nocke and Yeaple (2007) . This paper is complementary to theirs, …nding a similar result that shows that the nature of …rm heterogeneity (mobile vs. immobile input) matters for the …rm's choice whether to o¤shore or not. In their paper, Nocke and Yeaple examine cross-border M&A as a form of market access. Their speci…cation corresponds to the case of o¤shoring in the present paper as it assumes lower marginal costs as the result of the cross-border merger. However, the lower the initial marginal costs of the …rm, the lower the gains from engaging in cross-border M&A, resulting in the most e¢ cient …rms remaining inactive (due to the presence of …xed costs). In the present paper, this result is obtained with o¤shoring, but not in the case of vertical FDI.
If the relocation of the manufacturing stage always results in a drop in marginal costs, independent of your initial level of e¢ ciency, even the most e¢ cient …rms will choose to relocate.
In its initial con…guration (i.e. without the option to move production abroad) the model resembles a two-dimensional version of Melitz (2003) . The equilibrium is similar -…rms with draws that result in marginal costs that are too high immediately exit, the remaining ones produce. 'Opening up' the economy is interpreted to add the option to move production abroad, thereby abstracting from exporting or horizontal FDI. A …rm's 'management' (or headquarters services) serves the role of a …rm-speci…c asset that can be used to service plants abroad, as …rst introduced by Helpman (1984) .
There are no transportation costs for management, but the actual management activity has to occur in the home country.
Because …rms are heterogeneous along two di¤erent dimensions, the model generates novel predictions regarding the e¤ect of globalization on di¤erent kinds of …rms. Importantly for welfare considerations, moving the manufacturing stage abroad allows high management productivity …rms to enter production which otherwise would have exited due to low manufacturing productivity. On the other hand, low management productivity …rms that previously would have entered now have to exit as a result of competitors choosing to relocate. While o¤shoring provides the biggest gains to …rms that had a bad manufacturing draw initially, vertical FDI keeps the initial productivity rankings intact in the sense that it is the most productive …rms (in either management or manufacturing) that see the largest growth as a result of global integration. The model predicts an ambiguous change in the number of varieties, but an increase in aggregate productivity.
Section two of the paper will introduce the model, section three discusses the closed economy equilibrium. Section four describes the changes in the open economy and the assumptions made.
Section …ve describes the new equilibrium. Section six compares the open and closed economy equilibria and discusses the e¤ects of 'globalization'. Finally, section seven concludes.
The Model

The Setup
There are two countries, North and South, that use labor to produce goods. The South only has one sector which produces a homogeneous good. The home country (assumed to be the North) has two sectors, one of which produces the same homogeneous good while the other sector produces di¤erentiated products. A fraction of income is spent on di¤erentiated goods, while the remaining income is spent on the homogenous good, which is the numeraire. Both countries are endowed with L units of labor. In what follows I will always assume that is small enough such that both countries produce the homogenous good and factor price equalization prevails. In fact, the common wage rate is normalized to equal one and labor is inelastically supplied.
The consumer side of the model follows the literature using the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) di¤erentiated goods setup. The representative consumer has a CES utility function of the form
where represents the mass of available goods. Let Q be the aggregate good, so Q U . Furthermore, the aggregate price is given by
Optimal consumption and expenditure decisions are given by
and
R is aggregate expenditure and given by
Note that > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution and is linked to by 1 = 1 . In the di¤erentiated sector, there is a continuum of …rms with mass M . Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated good !, resulting in monopolistic competition. The production of one unit of the …nal good requires two inputs which are both produced using labor, a unit of manufacturing and a unit of management.
Both input units are good-speci…c, so manufacturing and management input by a …rm that produces variety ! can only be used in the production of the …nal good of type !. There is no inter-…rm trade in intermediate goods. The amount of labor used by each …rm is a linear function of output:
Fixed cost of production are given by f D and are identical for each …rm. a 1 represents the productivity of the …rm in the production stage, since it is the number of workers needed for one unit of manufacturing input. Similarly, a 2 represents the …rm's productivity in management. Note that this implies that the …rm's marginal costs are equal to a 1 + a 2 : Firms are heterogeneous in the sense that each …rm draws the productivity parameters from two distributions g(a 1 ) and h(a 2 ). The two random variables are independent. A higher productivity …rm is a …rm that produces a variety at a lower cost than another …rm. Thus cost advantages and productivity advantages are equivalent. Cost advantages can occur in the production or manufacturing stage or both.
As is well known for these models, the …rms choose a pricing rule which involves a markup over marginal cost. The markup is a function of the elasticity of substitution :
Here 1 = 1 is the markup, with as a measure of substitutability between goods. W represents the (normalized) wage rate. An advantage of this setup is that …rm output, pro…t and revenue can all be characterized as functions of a 1 and a 2 :
where
1 describes a demand factor that is exogenous to the individual …rm's decision.
An equilibrium is characterized by a mass M of …rms and distributions (a 1 ja 2 ) and (a 2 ) over supports (0; a 1 ) and (0; a 2 ), respectively 1 . P is given by
I will de…ne an average productivity level e a such that P = M 1 1 p(e a; e a):
2 e a represents a weighted average, where the weights are given by relative output shares:
Equilibrium quantities for aggregates in the economy can now be simply displayed as functions of the weighted average productivity level e a. 3 Quantitatively there is no di¤erence between the aggregate outcomes of the case of M …rms drawing their productivity levels randomly from the distributions given above and the case of M representative, identical …rms with the productivity parameter e a for both manufacturing and management. This allows me to write aggregate revenue R, output Q and pro…t as a function of e a only:
= M (e a; e a)
Note that q(e a; e a) denotes the quantity produced by a …rm with both productivity levels equal to e a.
Entry and Exit of Firms
There is an in…nite number of potential entrants into the di¤erentiated goods sector. Before entering, …rms are identical. As soon as a …rm decides to enter, it draws productivity parameters for its manufacturing and its management stage. The distributions for the parameters are given by g(a 1 )
1 The choice to describe the distribution of manufacturing productivity conditional on management productivity is an arbitrary one at this point due to the symmetry of the setup. 2 This uses the pricing rule (6) 3 Note that e a represents average productivity at each production stage. Thus average productivity in producing the …nal good in the economy is given by e a 2 . and h(a 2 ), respectively. The supports are given by (0; a 1 ] and (0; a 2 ]. The two draws are assumed to be independent. Also, entering requires the payment of a one-time …xed cost, f e . The random draws imply that a …rm does not know its own productivity before entering the industry. This appears to be a realistic assumption in accord with the empirical fact that a large number of start-ups fail soon after they enter their respective industry.
Once a …rm has entered the industry and decides to stay, its productivity parameters remain constant over the lifetime of the …rm.
Equilibrium in the closed economy
Without the option to move the manufacturing stage, the two stages of production of the …nal good are symmetric. Is is helpful to introduce f (M C) to denote the distribution of the sum of a 1 and a 2 ; because the only value that is relevant to the decisions of the …rms is total marginal cost a 1 + a 2 : Firms that draw productivity levels that result in marginal costs that are higher than some cuto¤ M C will exit the industry, while all other …rms will enter and produce.
In order to …nd the unique cuto¤ level for marginal cost M C ; I use the following two equilibrium conditions:
and (14) is the condition that ensures that the …rm with marginal costs that are at the cuto¤ level will make zero pro…ts. (15) ensures that expected operating pro…ts (given by the left-hand side) are equal to the initial entry costs f e . Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the equilibrium graphically. Note that > 1,
is actually a measure of productivity. 
' Opening up'the model to o¤shoring or vertical FDI
In this paper, the process of globalization is studied insofar as it enables …rms to move parts of their production processes into other countries. Deliberately, all of the other elements of two-country models are abstracted from. In particular, there is no costly trade between the two countries, which implies that exporting is no di¤erent from domestic sales and in the homogenous product sector it is of no relevance whether a good produced in the home country is also consumed there or possibly exported to the foreign country.
Each …rm in the di¤erentiated sector in the North is now has the choice to relocate the manufacturing production stage into the South. The management stage is tied to the North. This assumption seems plausible taking into account factors such as political pressure to keep headquarters operations within the home country and stylized facts that show that a¢ liates of U.S. multinationals have seen an increase in manufacturing employment over the last decades while manufacturing employment in the U.S. has declined.
The literature names two main factors that in ‡uence a …rm's decision to relocate their production abroad. The main driver is the potential for cost savings, which are mostly brought about by lower wages and reduction in other costs (for example lower environmental standards). 4 On the other hand, moving stages of the production process abroad incurs additional transportation cost, since the intermediate goods have to be shipped for further processing. I combine these two counteracting factors into one stylized e¤ect, which is modeled as a new draw of the manufacturing productivity parameter, which replaces the 'old'draw for a 1 . In other words, the decision to move the manufacturing stage is complete and …nal -once a …rm decides to relocate manufacturing abroad, it can only choose to exit if the new draw is not high enough -it cannot move production back to the home country. Also, all of a …rm's manufacturing takes place in the foreign country, once it chooses to move.
There is empirical support for the notion that …rms that move parts of their production process abroad are indeed 'rewarded'by higher labor productivity in their plants. Goerg, Hanley and Strobl (2005) …nd that Irish plants that use a larger share of imported inputs also display higher levels of labor productivity. The e¤ect is relatively stronger when the imported inputs are materials rather than services and for plants that are 'embedded in international markets'which means that the plant is either foreign-owned or exports its products to foreign markets.
The fact that the draw is uncertain captures the e¤ect that the exact gains from vertical investment are often unknown to the …rm prior to the undertaking. Furthermore, once a …rm decides to manufacture abroad rather than domestically, the overhead costs increase from f D to f O . Similar to the …xed cost for exporters in Melitz (2003) and the increased overhead costs for exporters and …rms that engage in horizontal FDI in Helpman et al. (2004) , opening up a new production site in a di¤erent country is bound to incur initial setup costs which do not vary with output. These setup costs can be caused by having to acquire information on foreign factor markets and comply with foreign regulations, laws etc.
These costs cannot be avoided by the …rm and are subject to manipulation by foreign governments.
In particular, one can think of the ongoing process of global economic integration as reducing these …xed costs of outsourcing, which is a scenario that is examined later.
Obviously, the distribution of the 'new' manufacturing productivity parameters is crucial. It is not clear whether the distribution should be correlated with a …rm's initial parameter draws. Several scenarios can be envisioned:
A …rm with high management productivity may have an advantage in any area of its business and thus also in making vertical investment decisions. The consequence would be a positive correlation between the initial realization of a 2 and the newly drawn parameter a
A …rm with high initial manufacturing productivity may be able to bring some of those advantages to bear in the new market. The consequence would be a positive correlation between the initial realization of a 1 and the new parameter a Setting up production in a new country is su¢ ciently removed from initial operations in the home country to warrant no signi…cant correlation between a …rm's initial draws and the new draw.
As a …rst step, potential correlations are neglected and the third option is analyzed. In addition, the distribution of the new draw is degenerate, simplifying the analysis further. In other words, relocation of the manufacturing stage always results in the same new productivity for manufacturing, which is denoted by a The fact that o¤shoring can only improve the manufacturing part of the marginal cost has an immediate, interesting implication. There is now a minimum productivity level in management a 2 that a …rm has to reach in order to even consider investing in production in the foreign country. a 2 is implicitly de…ned by:
Here f O > f D represents the higher overhead for …rms that o¤shore. Clearly, in equilibrium (for a given B) all …rms with a draw for management productivity that is greater than a 2 will not consider moving production, because the (potential) gain through lower marginal costs will not compensate for the increase in overhead costs from f D to f O : This splits the …rms along management productivity lines:
Firms that have drawn a 2 < a 2 will consider o¤shoring and are also guaranteed to enter production (since a N 1 is deterministic). However, if their draw for a 1 is close enough or even lower than a N 1 they will choose not to move production because marginal cost will not fall by enough (and possibly not at all). The cuto¤ value for a 1 which makes these …rms exactly indi¤erent between domestic manufacturing and o¤shoring is denoted by a
Firms that have drawn a 2 > a 2 will either choose domestic production or exit. For these …rms there will be a cuto¤ level for a 1 , denoted by a 1 , above which they are forced to exit altogether.
It is still true that expected operating pro…ts have to be exactly equal to the …xed entry cost f e :
In addition, the conditions for the various cuto¤ levels are now given by
The list of unknowns is B; a 1 (a 2 ); a p 1 ; a 2 -so we have four unknowns in four equations. While the problem for …rms with a 2 above a 2 is still described by a graph like Figure 1 , the two pro…t functions for …rms that may o¤shore are shown in Figure 3 : Figure 3 : Pro…ts from o¤-shoring and domestic production for a given a 2 = x
The upper envelope of the two pro…t functions re ‡ects the pro…ts of a …rm with a draw of a 2 = x as a function of (a 1 + x)
The cuto¤ draw for a 1 that changes the …rm's decision from o¤shoring to domestic production is given by a There will be a segment of …rms that now enter production while they would have exited without the option to move production abroad. These …rms are characterized by high productivity in management and very low (initial) productivity in manufacturing.
There is a second segment of …rms that switch from domestic production to vertical FDI. These …rms are also characterized by high management and low manufacturing productivity.
Finally, there are …rms that opt not to change their production process. These …rms already have a high level of manufacturing productivity prior to receiving the option to move production abroad.
In order to judge how well these results hold up under alternative speci…cations, I next examine the parallel case to Grossman et al. (2006) , namely that …rms that are previously good in manufacturing will continue to be good at it. The new productivity parameter will be proportional to the old one, a case which can be thought of as re ‡ecting vertical FDI, since previously highly-e¢ cient …rms will still be highly-e¢ cient after acquiring or opening a production site abroad.
Vertical FDI
As stated before, the main reasons that …rms relocate parts of their production process is lower costs.
The simple way in which the change in costs is modeled within this framework implies that making the assumption that the new productivity parameter a N 1 is proportional to the previous manufacturing draw by the …rm is in fact isomorphic to one where the productivity factor of the …rm stays the same, but it pays lower wages for work done in the South. This is the assumption made in Grossman et al. 
Clearly, the slope of the line for (21) in (a 1 ; a 2 )-space is exactly one, whereas it is w < 1 for (22).
Also, at a 1 = 0; pro…ts from domestic manufacturing are higher than those using vertical FDI by exactly f O f D ; which is positive by assumption. Given that both the intercept and the (absolute value of the) slope of the domestic manufacturing line is higher than for the vertical FDI line, the two lines must cross exactly once. At that point, …rms are exactly indi¤erent between domestic and foreign manufacturing. Using the implicit function theorem we arrive at Proposition 1:
; the line describing all points at which …rms are indi¤ erent between vertical FDI and domestic production crosses the interception of (21) and (22) from above.
Proof. See appendix.
The proposition provides the condition that needs to hold for a 2 to still represent a threshold management productivity level reaching or exceeding which is a necessary condition for a …rm to consider relocation of the manufacturing stage. Intuitively, the advantage from moving manufacturing abroad needs to be signi…cant enough, either because of a low value for w or a high value for the relative …xed costs of domestic production and o¤shoring, respectively. 5 While the details of the region boundaries in Figures 4 and 5 are di¤erent, the qualitative results remain similar to the more simplistic case of deterministic marginal cost awaiting …rms that o¤shore.
One di¤erence is that in this scenario, not every …rm with a management draw of a 2 or lower will automatically enter production. Those who have fairly low initial manufacturing draws may still exit now, since the rewards from FDI are proportional. Note also that it is still true that there are some 'star'…rms that choose not to use the option to move the manufacturing stage because the reduction in marginal cost is not worth the increase in overhead. This is a result that is contrary to previous …ndings in the literature. The reason is that …rms are allowed to have di¤erent productivities in their two production stages in this paper, and vertical FDI only improves one of them. This model would generate the same predictions as Grossman et al. if …rms were allowed to also move their management abroad and enjoy the lower marginal cost factor w: However, management has to remain in the home country and forms part of a …rm's marginal costs in this model. Therefore, there will always be a initial level of manufacturing productivity which is high enough to get …rms to stay and manufacture
domestically.
An important question is whether the mere introduction of the option to move the location of the manufacturing stage changes the values of cuto¤s. Put in a di¤erent way -are there …rms with management productivity below a 2 that entered the industry prior to closer economic integration but are now driven out? The next section deals with this question.
6 The e¤ects of opening up the economy
The case of two management productivity levels
In this section I examine the e¤ects of moving from one equilibrium to the other. Since this paper focuses on the aspects of globalization that make it easier for …rms to shift parts of their production processes abroad, I examine the changes caused by giving …rms the option to o¤shore, which they formerly did not have. As a corollary to the results of opening up to trade documented by Melitz, high productivity …rms generally "win", while low productivity …rms that did produce without o¤shoring may now be driven out of the industry.
In order to clarify the exposition and generate some analytical results, I return to the degenerate For comparison purposes, let us remember the equilibrium in this case for an economy without the o¤shoring option. There is a cuto¤ level for marginal cost M C ; and thus the a 1 -cuto¤ level between production and exit for …rms that have drawn a L 2 for management productivity is given by
Similarly, the cuto¤ for the low management productivity …rms is
Clearly, we have a
There is also a demand factor that the …rms take as given,
The equilibrium conditions are
In the last condition we assume that the two draws for management productivity are equally probable.
Given values for a Now we introduce the option to o¤shore. As we saw in Figure 5 , …rms that are productive enough to bene…t from o¤shoring (in this scenario that is …rms that draw a L 2 ) will always enter production, the question is only whether they produce locally or abroad. For low productivity …rms the question is still only between exit and entry. So the conditions are now given by
Furthermore, we have the assumptions
These conditions lead us directly to Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 The introduction of the option to o¤ shore results in a lower cuto¤ level a H 1 ; meaning that the least productive …rms are driven out.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, expected pro…ts ex-ante must stay the same since they are tied down by the …xed entry cost f e : Since drawing a high management productivity value now guarantees production, expected pro…ts conditional on having drawn a L 2 increase and average productivity e a does, as well. Thus it has to be the case that expected pro…ts conditional on having drawn a H 2 decrease, and this is achieved by decreasing the cuto¤ value and thus making it less likely for …rms that have drawn a H 2 to enter production to begin with. Note that this also has a positive e¤ect on e a; which therefore unambiguously rises compared to the old scenario.
A corollary of Proposition one is that the new demand level B is lower than before introducing the option of vertical foreign investment. This can only be due to two possible factors, a decrease in nominal expenditure R or a decrease in the price level P: A decrease in P can be due to a decrease in the prices charged by individual …rms or due to a decrease in the total number of …rms entering. R in these models is set by the size of the economy, which has not changed. Thus it has to be the case that P has decreased.
Proposition 3
The introduction of the option to o¤ shore results in every …rm having the same or a higher total productivity level.
Proof. For the …rms drawing a note that the …rm that before was the marginal …rm with productivity levels (a This leaves open the question of the total number of available varieties. Does the exodus of …rms with low management productivity result in an overall decrease in available varieties, or is the increased number of …rms with high management productivity, that can now stay in business because they are able to shift production abroad, enough to compensate or even exceed that number?
Unfortunately, without further information regarding the distribution of productivity levels this question is impossible to answer. It reduces to the question whether G(a
); which represents the mass of exiting …rms, is greater than 1 G(a
), which represents the …rms that are now able to enter.
Continuous support for both distributions of productivity levels
The previous subsection analyzed the case of only two possible outcomes for the management productivity draw due to analytical tractability. In this subsection I discuss what the likely consequences of relaxing this assumption would be. For that reason, I now assume that the support for the distribution of a 2 is given by (0; a 2 ]:
Recall that as soon as there is continuous support, there is also a cuto¤ level for a 2 which splits the …rms into those that choose between o¤hsoring and domestic production and those that only choose between exiting and domestic production.
(33) Figure 6 shows the e¤ect of introducing the option of o¤shoring on the domestic di¤erentiated products sector. In the initial equilibrium, …rms with draws in the areas A and B will exit, all other …rms enter the industry and produce. Introducing the productivity gains of o¤shoring will have di¤erent e¤ects depending on whether the …rm is above or below the management cuto¤ level a 2 : For …rms with productivity levels in the area C, the drop in the exogenous demand factor B results in negative pro…ts, so that these …rms are driven out. Firms in area D are …rms that do not change, but for di¤erent reasons. Those that are above a 2 do not choose to o¤shore because it will not generate positive pro…ts, independent on how much their manufacturing productivity might improve. The …rms in area D below a 2 do not choose to o¤shore because the gains in manufacturing productivity are not worth the increase in overhead costs. Clearly, an increase in the productivity level achieved by o¤shoring would shift the boundary between D and E to the left, at the same time as it would raise a 2 and shift the general cuto¤ line to the left due to the indirect e¤ect on B: If wage cost di¤erences between the North and the South are signi…cant, the process of globalization will result in a relatively larger number of …rms to exit and a relatively smaller number of …rms keeping their manufacturing stage in the North.
Finally, …rms in area B are clearly the ones bene…ting the most from the opportunity to move production abroad. They would not have been able to produce in the initial equilibrium due to too high manufacturing costs. Their high management productivity, however, results in them being able to take advantage of globalization by entering the industry and making positive pro…ts.
Summarizing, the rise of o¤shoring causes the overall demand factor B to fall, since di¤erentiated products can now be produced at lower costs on average. This causes pro…ts for all …rms that do not move production abroad to fall. Firms in the area C in Figure 5 exit production. Firms in area E switch from domestic manufacturing to foreign based manufacturing, thereby raising their pro…ts.
Finally …rms in area B raise their pro…ts dramatically, because they have no prospects of entry without the possibly of production stage relocation.
Note the di¤erence to the basic result emphasized by Melitz: In his paper, 'opening up'the economy corresponds to …rms gaining the opportunity to export. As a result, the more productive a …rm is, the more it gains from trade. Here, it is not the …rms that are most productive overall that gain the most, but instead it is …rms that are very productive in the management stage but initially have relatively high manufacturing costs, resulting in a large gain from moving the manufacturing stage abroad.
E¤ects of a continuing process of globalization
Generally, global economic integration is not seen as occurring in discrete jumps, but rather as a gradual process. Thus it is of interest to examine the changes in Figure 6 that would occur if 'globalization'-related parameters were to continue changing.
Given that the new draw for manufacturing productivity captures a host of di¤erent costs related to moving a production process abroad, we study the case of a decrease in a N 1 : Even though factor price equalization may be expected to erode labor cost di¤erences over time, transportation and communication costs fall, as well, which makes the case that relocation of manufacturing processes becomes more attractive as globalization continues a plausible one.
A drop in a N 1 will cause more …rms to shift their manufacturing abroad (see Figure 7 ). Note that the …rms in the triangular area above the (new) value for a 2 are left with relatively high marginal costs compared to the …rms with higher management productivity, many of which now choose to move manufacturing abroad. This corresponds to high prices and thus to low output, so those …rms will in general be rather small. So the model displays one of the obvious consequences of economic integration, which is to drive out smaller …rms while generating opportunities for …rms with high management productivity. The model shares this particular feature with the original model by Melitz.
Next we can also envision a reduction in f O ; which corresponds to the costs of setting up a production site in a foreign country approaching the corresponding costs in the home country. Inspection of (33) reveals that a decrease in f O will also move a 2 upwards, resulting in ceteris paribus more …rms choosing to move manufacturing abroad. At the same time, the trade-o¤ between domestic production and FDI for those …rms below a 2 will move to the left, so that the resulting change in the will be very similar to the one depicted in Figure 7 . Note that the upwards movement of a 2 is limited by the simultaneous decrease in B due to the increase in overall average productivity. In other words, even with a 'high degree of globalization' we don't expect to see a 2 to be close to a 2 ; meaning that most …rms can engage in vertical FDI and produce.
Summarizing, a continuing process of globalization can be examined in this model via two di¤erent comparative statics exercises. As it turns out, both the reduction in overhead for production oversees and an increase in the productivity gains achieved via vertical FDI have similar e¤ects. Small …rms with low management productivity are driven out of production, while the number of …rms that engage in vertical FDI increases. Eventually, …rms that retain manufacturing in the home country will be characterized by very high productivity in both management and manufacturing -all other …rms will have either exited or shifted the manufacturing stage. During this adjustment process, it is mainly …rms that shift their manufacturing stages that grow (meaning their output and pro…ts increase).
Firms that retain domestic manufacturing, on the other hand, see a decrease in pro…ts due to the ever more competitive nature of the monopolistic competition and the subsequent decline in the demand factor B:
By de…nition the model cannot address aspects of unemployment and changes in the composition of the workforce. In addition, it does not explicitly model changes in factor prices. The literature on this aspect of o¤shoring is understandably vast, see for example Venables (1999) , Deardor¤ (2001) or Kohler (2004) . In this model, there is only one production factor, so all kinds of labor are homogenous in this model. Also, employment is always full and is given exogenously by the size of the world (which is 2L). However, we can note that domestic …rms that engage in o¤shoring or vertical FDI will expand output and thus require more workers in the management sector. Also, employment in the homogenous goods sector in the South decreases, which means that the domestic homogenous sector has to increase, in order to produce the same amount of goods globally (recall that the fractions of expenditure spent on the various types of goods are given by and 1 and constant.) So the implied change in the transition of the workforce in the home country is a ‡ow from manufacturing jobs into management jobs but also into the homogenous goods sector.
6.4 Relaxing the assumption of a degenerate distribution of a
Most parts of the analysis up to this point were obviously facilitated by the assumption of o¤shoring having a known, deterministic bene…t in form of a new and higher productivity measure for the manufacturing stage. A more realistic characterization would be another uncertain draw, with bad outcomes that could feasibly lead to exit of …rms that have made the decision to move production abroad. For example, while there may be wage di¤erences the …rm was hoping to take advantage of, the costs of transportation and coordination with foreign o¢ cials may exceed expectations, leading to less cost saving that initially anticipated. For this scenario to leave the qualitative results derived up to this point unchanged, we only need to make the following assumptions. The continued validity of the results hinges on ex-post average productivity of …rms with a given management draw a 2 < a 2 (where a 2 is now computed using E B(a This guarantees that in fact the ex-post average productivity levels for …rms with management draw a 2 < a 2 is higher than in the scenario without vertical FDI. 6 The new conditions corresponding to (17) -(20) are given by:
The possibility of a bad draw introduces another way that the option of o¤shoring leads to increased exit by low productivity …rms: While all …rms below a 2 will choose to o¤shore (because their expected pro…ts cover the overhead f O ), …rms whose level of management productivity is high are ex-ante more likely to stay in business after the realization of the FDI draw. This e¤ect is similar to the one documented in the vertical FDI case of section 5.2.
Overall, the main result remains: By causing an overall decrease in average marginal cost in the di¤erentiated goods sector, the option to move manufacturing stages abroad leads to welfare gains.
The exact channel through which welfare increases is the decline in the price index, while the amount of total nominal expenditure remains …xed at the level of the total labor force (of both countries combined, since foreign country consumers also consume di¤erentiated goods).
Conclusions
This paper constructs a heterogeneous …rms model that allows for two distinct production stages that are required to produce the …nal good. While trade is costless and the paper thus abstracts form the e¢ ciency gains caused by inter-industry redistribution documented by Melitz (2003) , global economic integration is still shown to lead to e¢ ciency gains by allowing …rms to move their production stages into the foreign country, which, while being costly, is assumed to lead to productivity gains at the …rm level.
Interestingly, the …rms that bene…t most from this kind of economic integration are not those with the lowest marginal costs ex-ante. Instead, it is …rms that are very productive in executing the task that has to remain in the home country (management) but initially not so productive in the manufacturing stage that experience the largest increases in pro…ts. The details of these e¤ects depend on various assumptions regarding the distributions of the productivity parameters and their potential correlation. Two cases are emphasized: o¤shoring is assumed to result in a new marginal cost draw for manufacturing that is independent of a …rm's initial manufacturing draw. Vertical FDI, on the other hand, lowers marginal manufacturing costs proportionally to the …rm's inital costs. As long as moving the manufacturing stage to the South is costly, there will be …rms in equilibrium that choose to keep manufacturing in the North. As 'globalization'progresses, these …rms will enjoy lower pro…ts, because the overall decrease in production costs depresses the price level. At a late stage, only few, large, high manufacturing and management productivity …rms will remain that still locate the manufacturing stage of production in the home country.
The analysis is deliberately stylized, which prohibits detailed results with respect to the exact nature of the e¢ ciency gains from o¤shoring. A more detailed look at welfare consequences from the change in number of varieties or the loss of resources due to unsuccessful o¤shoring projects is left for future research.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The implicit function de…ning a 1 and a 2 is given by
The solution where both pro…t levels are exactly zero is known: Figure 5 to be re ‡ecting the equilibrium) we require
Proof of Proposition 2:
By contradiction: Suppose the cuto¤ level stayed the same. Then B must also be the same. Then using (27) and (30) we get For the same reasons as in the previous case this forms a contradiction.
